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game, refusing results in less absolute gain, but increased relative 
equity, as both participants get nothing; Bolton and Zwick, 1995). 
Note, too, that peoples’ refusals in this context are not inequity 
aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as individu-
als are increasing rather than decreasing inequity. However, recent 
evidence indicates that people routinely refuse unequal offers in 
the impunity game, making this an important set of circumstances 
to evaluate more fully (Yamagishi et al., 2009).
Humans are not alone in this. Other species show very similar 
behaviors. In a game reminiscent of an impunity game, two species 
of primate have been shown to refuse rewards more often when 
their partners get better rewards than when their partners receive 
the same, lower-value rewards (Brosnan, 2006; details in next sec-
tion). While this behavior seems economically irrational, it is a 
very consistent response in both these primates and humans. This 
raises questions about the evolution of this behavior on a number 
of levels. First, is it possible that the underlying function of this 
behavior is similar across species, including humans? Second, even 
if the behavior has been selected for similar reasons, what are the 
mechanisms that lead to the behavior? Related to this, how do we 
account for the individual differences seen in the behavior, and 
are these differences, and their causes, consistent across species?
Although the data we have now provide pieces of the puzzle, 
there is as yet no satisfying functional explanation, and the very 
ubiquity of the response demands an answer. One hypothesis is 
that recognizing and responding to inequitable outcomes increases 
IntroductIon
When making decisions about resources, humans show an intense 
interest in how their outcomes compare to those of others. In the 
laboratory, people will reject absolute gains in order to keep oth-
ers from receiving more (Guth et al., 1982), even if this results in 
greater inequity (Yamagishi et al., 2009). This behavior seems to 
affect offers, too; individuals offer more when their partner has a 
chance to refuse than when they have no recourse (e.g., compar-
ing the ultimatum to the dictator games; Camerer, 2003). People’s 
reaction to inequity is also highly context dependent. Subjects make 
different decisions if the right to control distributions must be 
earned (Hoffman et al., 1994) or if they have an opportunity to 
respond in some other way (Xiao and Houser, 2005). We do not 
make decisions in a vacuum, but instead seem to care very much 
how our outcomes compare to those of our social partners.
Although much of this research is done using the ultimatum 
game, another important game in this vein is the impunity game. In 
this game, one individual, the proposer, is given an endowment of 
money and must decide how to split the money between themselves 
and another individual, the responder. The responder then has two 
options; if they accept, the distribution is given to each individual as 
proposed, as in the ultimatum game, but if they reject, the proposer 
receives their money, but the responder receives nothing. This game 
is little studied, likely because refusing results in both less absolute 
gain and increased relative inequity for the responder, thus it was 
assumed that no rational actor would refuse (in the Ultimatum 
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individuals’ payoffs from cooperation. If this is the case in humans, 
it may be in other species as well, but only recently has enough 
data emerged to begin to address this hypothesis in species other 
than humans. In this paper, I discuss this emerging evidence in 
non-human primates, and based on three main lines of inquiry 
put forth the hypothesis that there has been co-evolution between 
cooperation and inequity across the animal kingdom. I discuss the 
implications of this hypothesis for other, related, areas of inquiry. 
Finally, I end with ideas for further tests to evaluate and refine this 
hypothesis, both in primates and other species.
InequIty paradIgms In other specIes
Given inherent species differences, most of the protocols for study-
ing inequity in other species are simpler than those in humans, for 
instance requiring no verbal instruction. In the typical paradigm, 
two individuals from the same social group are paired, and they 
must alternately complete a task to receive a reward (see Figure 1 
for details of the experimental procedure). Each can see the others’ 
performance and the others’ outcomes. In the baseline condition, 
rewards are the same, but in the inequity condition, one partner 
receives a reward which is more preferred (e.g., based on previous 
preference tests between the rewards; see Table 1). Thus we can 
compare individuals’ reactions to a reward when their partner gets 
the same reward as they do versus a more preferred one. Additional 
controls can examine potentially mediating factors such as the role 
of differential effort or the way in which the mere presence of 
higher-value rewards (which are not given to a conspecific) may 
affect reactions. Such studies have now been done in a variety of 
primates, as have similar studies in other taxa (Heidary et al., 2008; 
Range et al., 2008).
Decisions to refuse a reward stem from many factors, nonethe-
less these results cannot be fully explained by processes other than 
the aversion to inequitable outcomes. For instance, it has been pro-
posed that refusals of rewards may be due to a “frustration effect,” 
in which subjects compare their current outcomes to those which 
they received previously, and protest if the comparison comes up 
wanting (Roma et al., 2006). Such individual contrast effects are 
seen in a wide variety of species (Tinklepaugh, 1928; Friedan et al., 
2009), however they do not explain these results. In controlled 
experiments, the mere presence of the higher-value rewards did 
not cause increased rejections, even when the experimenter called 
the subjects’ attention to the preferred reward prior to each inter-
action (Brosnan et al., 2010a). Of course it is likely that these two 
phenomena are built on similar cognitive underpinnings; in both 
cases, subjects compare their current outcomes to some other ref-
erent and find the current outcome wanting. However, in the case 
of the “frustration” effect, the referent is individual, or one’s own 
previous outcomes, whereas in the case of inequity, the referent is 
social, or one’s partners’ outcomes. Thus the response to inequity 
can be thought of as a “social contrast” or “social frustration” effect. 
Given the ubiquity of individual contrast effects, as well as atten-
tion to others’ outcomes (e.g., in the context of social learning), we 
might expect inequity responses to be widespread.
Primates also show quite a bit of variation in their responses. 
Considering only chimpanzees, responses vary both within and 
between experiments. Thus far, factors which have been implicated 
in this variation include dominance rank, sex, and group identity. 
Other factors, such as personality and individuals’ relationships 
are also likely to play a role. However there is not yet consistency 
in which factors affect behavior, probably due to both interactions 
between these and other effects and the relatively small sample size 
which has been tested (approximately three dozen chimpanzees, 
which is large for primate studies, but too small to pinpoint such 
interactions). Larger studies are currently underway to investigate 
this variation. It is also not yet clear how this compares to inter-
individual differences in humans, as studies with humans typically 
focus on mean responses rather than individual behavior.
hypotheses for the functIon of the response to 
InequIty
It has been proposed that the inequity response functions to increase 
the success of long-term cooperative relationships amongst unre-
lated individuals (hereafter cooperation; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Brosnan, 2006). Although this was originally proposed with respect 
to humans, new evidence provides support for this hypothesis in an 
evolutionary context. Specifically, the ability to recognize situations 
in which one is receiving a less good outcome than a partner, or 
inequity, may allow individuals to determine when their coopera-
tive partners are taking more than their fair share and are thus no 
longer to one’s benefit as a partner. In other words, an aversion 
to inequity can be a mechanism which encourages individuals to 
switch to a new partner when they find themselves in a situation 
which is not to their advantage. This ultimately functions to increase 
payoffs by encouraging individuals to seek out new partners. If the 
new partner is more equitable, then there is a benefit and the indi-
vidual will have an absolute gain, despite temporary costs associated 
with time spent searching for new partners or potential interludes 
with other inequitable individuals. This mechanism would be under 
strong positive selection due to the potential for large fitness gains. 
Note that while the original inequity aversion formulation assumed 
that individuals were averse to decisions which increased relative 
inequity (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), even reactions that increase 
short-term inequity (e.g., in the Impunity game) may serve to 
increase long-term equity by moving actors in to relationships 
which are more beneficial.
Figure 1 | A schematic diagram indicating the procedure for each trial of 
an inequity test. Two primates (P1 and P2) are tested in a pair. For each 
condition (see Table 1, columns 1 and 2), the primates must sequentially 
perform a task with the experimenter (typically a token exchange; Table 1, 
column 3) in order to receive a food reward (Table 1, column 4; see full 
description of each condition in column 5). An arrow indicates the order in 
which the object (token or food) moves between the experimenter (E) and the 
primates in each step of the trial. In all studies in my laboratory, primates are 
seated side-by-side. Monkeys are separated by a mesh barrier which they can 
reach through while apes are not separated. The details of the exchange task 
and the foods given to each primate are determined by the test condition; for 
details see Table 1.
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This hypothesis also ties in nicely with other hypotheses for 
why individuals respond negatively to inequity. It has been argued 
that responding negatively to inequity, including when one is the 
benefited party, can function as a commitment device (Frank, 1988, 
2001; Yamagishi et al., 2009). Responding in this way indicates to 
both one’s current and potential future partners that you are a very 
good partner (i.e., you do not treat your other partners inequita-
bly), and may also send a signal which increases one’s reputation 
(Frank, 2004). Similarly, refusing absolute gains which are relatively 
unequal sends a signal to potential partners that they cannot get 
away with such behavior with you, which may increase future pay-
offs (Yamagishi et al., 2009). Such behavior represents a short-term 
cost (in the form of lost immediate gains) for a long-term gain (in 
the form of long-term beneficial relationships).
Evidence is beginning to emerge to support the hypothesis that 
cooperation and the response to inequity are linked in species besides 
humans (see Existing Evidence in Support of the Hypothesis). Such 
a link may provide evidence for how the response evolved. This 
question is more than academic. Understanding the evolutionary 
trajectory of a behavior can help elucidate its evolutionary func-
tion. Moreover, while it is often assumed that traits within a taxon 
are likely to be homologous, this does not need to be the case. My 
research indicates that responding negatively to receiving less than 
one’s partners is not homologous among primates, but rather is con-
vergent, and the trait which best maps on to it is cooperation. Below 
I summarize lines of evidence leading to this conclusion, relying on 
data from a number of different species in several different contexts.
Note, too, that this would not need to be consciously understood 
by the individual; those who developed an aversion to inequity 
through whatever mechanism (e.g., an emotional reaction) would 
be more likely to succeed, increasing the frequency of the reaction 
in the population. Considering one possible scenario, in most cases 
in which individuals experience inequity during or immediately 
following an interaction with another individual (e.g., not just in 
proximity to another, but after explicitly interacting with them), the 
inequity is likely to be related to the other’s actions. Although there 
would undoubtedly be a few situations in which this was not the 
case, this would be somewhat ameliorated if individuals kept track 
of more than one interaction in the relationship history, as they 
can do (Brosnan et al., 2006). Thus individuals who happened to 
respond in these situations could develop the behavior without an 
understanding of the others intentions or motives (although note 
that primates likely have the requisite understanding of intention-
ality and ability to inhibit; see The Context of the Interaction and 
Inequity and Self-Control). Alternatively, this mechanism could 
function similarly to that which has been proposed for attitudinal 
reciprocity, in which individuals base their moves on their cur-
rent feelings for their partner (Brosnan and de Waal, 2002; Schino 
and Aureli, 2010). Thus there is no expectation that an inequity 
response needs to be paired with any higher-order cognition in 
order to function in this way. In fact, only partner recognition 
is required, and this is likely widespread throughout the animal 
kingdom (including invertebrates; Karavanich and Atema, 1998; 
Tibbets, 2002; Steiger et al., 2008).
Table 1 | Description of experimental conditions (for a summary of the procedure, see Figure 1 and associated caption).
Abbreviation Condition name exchange Food Description
ETLV Equity test, low value Both exchange Both low value Both subject and partner exchanged for low value reward.
ETHV Equity test, high value Both exchange Both high value Both subject and partner exchanged for high value reward.
FC Food control Both exchange Both see high value before Prior to exchange, high value reward is held in front of 
   exchange, receive low exchanger and then is placed back in container. After 
   value following exchange successful completion of exchange, exchanger 
    receives low value reward.
IT Inequity test Both exchange Subject low value Partner exchanges for high value reward and subject  
   Partner high value exchanges for low value reward.
GR Gift reward No exchange Subject low value Partner is given a high value reward for “free” (e.g.,  
   Partner high value without exchange) and then subject is given a low 
    value reward.
DT Delay test Both exchange,  Both high value Partner exchanges for a high value reward and  
  subject waits 10 s  subject exchanges and must wait 10 s before  
  after exchange   receiving high value reward. 
  before receiving food
DETLV Differential exchange  Subject exchanges Both low value Partner is given a low value reward for “free” (e.g.,  
 test, low value Partner does not   without exchange) and subject must exchange for a 
  exchange  low value reward.
DETHV Differential exchange Subject exchanges Both high value Partner is given a high value reward for “free” (e.g.,  
 test, high value Partner does not   without exchange) and subject must exchange for a 
  exchange  high value reward.
Not all conditions are used in all experiments, but all are provided to give an overview of the types of questions which have been asked. The most critical tests are 
the ETLV, which collects baseline data on responses to lower-value rewards, the IT, which collects data on responses to lower-value rewards when one’s partner 
receives higher-value ones, and the FC, which is a control to determine reactions to lower-value rewards are present, but no primates receive one. Reprinted with 
permission from Brosnan et al. (2010a).
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intrinsically less motivated to cooperate when rewards are easily 
monopolizable than when rewards are distributed such that nei-
ther individual can dominate them (de Waal and Davis, 2002), 
indicating that they prefer to avoid situations which may result 
in inequity. Although the same studies have not been run with 
chimpanzees, these apes are more likely to work to obtain a joint 
reward when paired with a partner who tolerantly shares food than 
one who does not (Melis et al., 2006a) and, when given the choice, 
will choose a more tolerant rather than less tolerant partner with 
whom to work (Melis et al., 2006b). Together, these studies indi-
cate a close connection between cooperation and inequity, such 
that cooperation can survive modest or short-term inequity, but 
greater or more pervasive inequity leads to the cessation of the 
cooperative interaction. Such a response is indeed advantageous, 
as it allows individuals to identify partners with whom coopera-
tion is not paying off and alter their choices in the future without 
forfeiting a beneficial partnership due to one instance of cheating, 
misunderstanding, or coincidence.
the context of the InteractIon
In humans, much has been done to investigate the role of the experi-
ment’s context on how subjects respond to distributional inequity 
(although using monetary payoffs rather than food, as in non-
human species). One area relevant to cooperation is intentionality. 
Humans clearly distinguish between acts which were determined 
by another human being and those which were determined ran-
domly, without human intervention (e.g., by a computer). Humans 
respond behaviorally, less often refusing unfair outcomes when they 
are determined by computer (Blount, 1995) and also show differ-
ential brain activation between human-initiated and computer-
initiated distributional inequity (Knoch et al., 2006). It is typically 
assumed that the explanation for this is that subjects are sensitive 
to the intention behind the action; intentional actions must be 
responded to, while those which were the result of chance were 
“bad luck” that is not due to ones’ social partners and so do not 
require a response. This sensitivity to intentionality makes sense in 
light of cooperation. If your partner gets more than you do because 
of chance, then there is no reason to go find a new partner; this 
outcome provides no information at all about their value as a social 
partner. If, on the other hand, you were working together with a 
partner who then took a greater share of the benefits reaped, that 
is a clue about the partner’s value, and a sign to find a new partner. 
In other words, joint efforts should lead to joint outcomes (van 
Wolkenten et al., 2007).
In primates, there are few studies comparing “intentional” and 
“accidental” inequity, no doubt in part due to the difficulty of exper-
imentally distinguishing chance occurrence from intentionality in 
non-verbal species. However, those which do exist indicate behav-
ior similar to that seen in humans. Primates are sensitive to the 
intentionality of a human experimenter, responding more strongly 
when they drop a reward intentionally than when it appears to be 
an accident (Call et al., 2004). Within their own species, chimpan-
zees react more strongly to punish (e.g., take away access to food) 
a partner who previously stole that food from them than when it 
is simply an inequitable distribution (Jensen et al., 2007). In this 
latter study, chimpanzees had the option to pull down a “table” 
which held food their partner could access (thus taking away access 
exIstIng evIdence In support of the hypothesIs
If cooperation and responding to inequity are linked, a number of 
predictions emerge. Three among these have already accrued some 
evidence. First, inequitable outcomes should affect cooperation. 
Second, negative responses to inequity should be evident in the 
context of cooperation. Third, species which typically cooperate 
should show a greater tendency to reject inequitable outcomes than 
those which do not. Below I explore the evidence which addresses 
these predictions, focusing on behavior which is disadvantageous 
to the individual.
the Interplay of cooperatIon and InequIty
If cooperation and inequity are related, cooperation should be 
affected by inequitable outcomes (Brosnan, 2006; de Waal and 
Suchak, 2010). In fact, this question is of vital importance as it is 
rare that interactions result in complete equity, at least in the short 
term (Aghion et al., 1999). Thus any species which both successfully 
cooperates and responds to inequity must have some capacity for 
taking into account context or an ability to extrapolate over the 
longer term in order to maintain cooperative interactions.
Capuchin monkeys are excellent subjects in which to investigate 
this interaction as they are known to cooperate in many contexts, 
and to understand the contingencies of cooperation (Brosnan, 
2010). Although in most cases cooperation experiments utilize 
situations in which both individuals receive identical rewards, 
the few which do not are telling. In a study designed explicitly to 
address this question, monkeys could cooperate on a mutual task 
in which joint efforts resulted in rewards to both, but sometimes 
the rewards were unequal (Brosnan et al., 2006). Unlike in many 
cooperation experiments, the monkeys were not separated and thus 
had to decide between themselves which individual would pull 
which bar and, hence, receive which reward. Since the monkeys 
determined which one worked for which reward, rather than the 
experimenter, we could determine whether the presence of inequity 
affected cooperation, and whether they were able to work around it. 
In fact, the distribution of rewards (equal or unequal) did not affect 
cooperation, but the partner’s behavior influenced it greatly. If one 
individual consistently dominated the better rewards, cooperation 
dropped to almost a third of the rate seen in partnerships in which 
both monkeys alternated receiving the better rewards.
Intriguingly, this cessation of cooperation happened in all con-
ditions, including equitable ones in which no reward difference 
was possible. Thus, the monkeys were reacting to their partners’ 
behavior rather than the distribution of rewards. This is an impor-
tant point; clearly the monkeys are willing to tolerate inequity on 
a trial-by-trial basis as long as the overall outcomes are approxi-
mately the same. In other words, cooperation only breaks down 
when faced with long-term inequity, not the occasional unequal 
outcome. This explains how cooperation can be maintained in 
tasks such as group hunting or mating coalitions, which may result 
in unequal outcomes in the short term. Individuals will continue 
to cooperate despite the occasional lesser reward if their overall 
rewards remain equitable.
Other studies support this conclusion. Capuchin monkeys will 
help partners obtain rewards as long as the partner then shares some 
of the spoils, but, again, cooperation breaks down if no sharing 
occurs (de Waal and Berger, 2000). Moreover, capuchins appear 
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the response is likely not a homology among primates. Although 
any such analysis without information on all species is necessarily 
limited, we are at the point where it is useful to begin considering 
the phylogenetic data. Inequity seems to affect cooperative behavior, 
and the species in which the response to inequity was first docu-
mented, capuchins and chimpanzees, are known to cooperate, both 
in the laboratory (de Waal and Berger, 2000; Melis et al., 2006b) 
and in the field (Creel and Creel, 1995; Fragaszy et al., 2004; Mitani, 
2006; Langergraber et al., 2007), lending credence to this hypothesis. 
However, while the cooperation hypothesis is compelling, it is not 
the only possibility. For instance, inequity could be a homology 
among primates (or a more specialized group within the primate 
taxon), in which case investigations in to function will necessarily 
require other taxa. Second, this behavior could be an emergent 
behavior that arises when a species develops sufficient cognitive 
abilities to remember and compare outcomes between themselves 
and others. Third, it could also emerge as a by-product of social 
living. If individuals were already predisposed to pay attention to 
their partners’ outcomes, as is required, for instance, in some forms 
of social learning, they may then begin comparing their outcomes in 
other situations. Notice an important subtlety in these latter cases; 
the ability to gain benefits from social comparison may require 
certain cognitive skills, such as individual recognition, but that 
is independent of whether cognition is a functional explanation 
for the behavior. We can address these hypotheses by comparing 
primates which vary on these dimensions. Data exist for several 
species of great apes and new world monkeys, providing a more 
fine-grained analysis.
For these comparisons, it is important to keep the tasks and 
dependent variables as similar as possible across studies. Given that 
it is clear that a task is required to elicit inequity (see The Context 
of the Interaction), in all of the studies done in my laboratory we 
utilized an exchange-based task (Figure 1). The dependent variables 
were whether the primate completed the task and whether or not 
they accepted the reward, combined as a participation measure, and 
the latency to complete the interaction. Since the latter measure has 
not been seen to differ between conditions of equity and inequity, I 
focus here only on whether the subject refused to participate (e.g., 
refused to complete the task or accept the reward).
First considering the great apes, the response has been well doc-
umented in both humans and chimpanzees, as discussed above, 
although there is variation which needs to be further explored to 
fully elucidate how context affects the reaction (Brosnan et al., 2005, 
2010a; Bräuer et al., 2006, 2009). Considering chimpanzees’ sister 
species, bonobos, only one study has investigated bonobos in a 
comparable paradigm to chimpanzees. The bonobos refused twice 
as often in the inequity (approximately 20%) as compared to the 
equity (approximately 10%) condition, although this difference was 
not significant (possibly due to the small sample size; Bräuer et al., 
2009). This result rules out none of the potential hypotheses, but 
the fact that bonobos also cooperate, both in the laboratory (Hare 
et al., 2007) and the field (e.g., in social relationships; Parrish, 1996; 
Hohmann and Fruth, 2000; Fruth and Hohmann, 2002), provides 
support for the cooperation hypothesis.
Orangutans have also been well studied (Bräuer et al., 2006, 
2009; Brosnan et al., in review). These apes do not respond neg-
atively to inequity, even in a study which directly replicated the 
from the partner). If the partner got the food by taking away access 
from the subject, subjects were far more likely to pull down the 
table than if the partner was simply granted access to the food by 
the experimenter.
Primates are also quite sensitive to how rewards are received. 
Specifically, primates are most sensitive to inequity in the context of 
completing a task. Most inequity experiments require the subjects 
to complete a task (typically an exchange of a token) to receive 
their rewards (see Figure 1). However in other studies, subjects are 
handed food rewards alternately, but for “free,” i.e., with no task 
required to obtain the food (e.g., panels 2 and 4 in Figure 1). Thus 
far, no reactions to inequity have been found in any study which 
did not involve a task (Bräuer et al., 2006; Dubreuil et al., 2006; 
Roma et al., 2006; Fontenot et al., 2007). This includes one study 
(Dindo and de Waal, 2006) which used the same capuchin subjects 
which both previously and subsequently responded to inequity in 
paradigms which involved tasks. Several additional studies have 
explicitly compared the presence versus absence of a task, three 
using a within-subjects’ design and one a between-subjects’ design. 
In a within-subjects’ design, chimpanzees showed no reaction to 
inequity in the absence of a task (e.g., when rewards were handed 
out for “free”), while responding when they had to complete the 
task for their rewards (Brosnan et al., 2010a). In the other three 
species, all refused more often when no task was used despite sub-
jects not responding differentially between the equity and inequity 
conditions (Neiworth et al., 2009; Brosnan et al., in review; Talbot 
et al., in press).
There are several possibilities as to why the primates only 
respond to inequity when a task is involved. First, despite claims 
that the presence or absence of a task should be irrelevant (Roma 
et al., 2006), animals are known to treat rewards which are earned 
differently than those which are received for “free” (Carder and 
Berkowitz, 1970). Moreover, since captive animals routinely receive 
food from keepers in situations which are not equitable, it is possible 
that they have grown accustomed to inequity in non-task situations, 
and so do not respond in these situations. Finally, it may also be that 
the presence of a task mimics a joint activity, despite the sequential 
nature of the interaction, thus priming the individuals to expect 
more equitable outcomes (Brosnan et al., 2010a).
Of course, if cooperation is linked with inequity, one would 
expect other experimental or social contexts to be important as well. 
Reactions to inequity are affected by group membership (Brosnan 
et al., 2005), sex (Brosnan et al., 2010a), rank (Bräuer et al., 2006; 
Brosnan et al., 2010a), and experimental design (Brosnan et al., 
2010a) and, as discussed above, tolerance between individuals 
influences cooperative outcomes (Melis et al., 2006a). Similarly, 
individuals’ personalities or relationships may play a role. This has 
not been investigated in great detail in humans, possibly due to the 
tendency to test subjects in completely anonymous situations, with 
strangers, in part in an effort to rule out these factors as potential 
causes. Non-human primate studies offer a wonderful opportunity 
to investigate these factors in longitudinal studies.
a phylogenetIc approach
Not all species of primates respond to inequitable outcomes. A 
recent surge of studies have provided information on a far wider 
range of primate species than were initially tested, indicating that 
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cooperation. In the case of cooperative breeders, the interdepend-
ency between males and females (the partners in these experiments) 
may explain these results. If males and females rely on each other 
for their reproductive fitness, negative responses to minor inequities 
would end up being more costly than beneficial. Thus, individuals 
may do best to tolerate minor inequities and respond only when 
the inequitable outcomes become egregious.
Taken together, the current phylogenetic results most strongly 
support the hypothesis that inequity and cooperation are inter-
linked, providing evidence in favor of the cooperation hypoth-
esis for the evolution of the inequity response. Cognition may be 
necessary, but is not sufficient, as great apes with brain-to-body 
ratios on par with chimpanzees and capuchins, and comparable 
performance in cognitive tasks, do not respond negatively to ineq-
uity. The response is not a by-product of group-living, as several 
primates which are gregarious do not respond, including the highly 
social Callitrichids. However, species which routinely cooperate 
with non-kin in several different contexts respond negatively to 
inequity, while those who do not cooperate to this degree fail to do 
so. Moreover, interdependent species, which may not benefit from 
such a response, fail to respond to inequity.
ImplIcatIons of the hypothesIs
In short, there is emerging comparative evidence that links coopera-
tion and inequity. It is interesting to consider further implications 
of the hypothesized relationship between the negative response to 
inequity and cooperation.
InequIty and Interdependence
One intriguing aspect of the phylogenetic data is the possible role 
of interdependence in the response. Extreme interdependence 
occurs among cooperatively breeding species, in which the (unre-
lated) adults’ genetic fitness is directly tied to the fitness of others. 
This promotes cooperation (Roberts, 2005) and has been argued 
to explain the unusually high levels of prosocial behavior among 
mated pairs in cooperative breeding species (Clutton-Brock, 2002; 
Hrdy, 2009; Jaeggi et al., 2010; Van Schaik and Burkart, 2010). In 
other words, the parents are so dependent upon one another for 
their fitness that it is in their best interests to help each other in 
most circumstances, regardless of the cost. While there is currently 
only a single study investigating inequity responses in coopera-
tive breeders, the lack of evidence for an inequity response among 
mated partners may indicate that interdependence plays a role 
in inequity. Once the relationship is established, continuing the 
interaction may be worthwhile even if their partner is getting a 
better deal. The cost of abandoning one’s breeding partner to find 
a new one due to a small act of inequity would be strongly selected 
against, and only extreme inequity may be sufficient to change this 
cost–benefit calculation.
Humans are worth considering in this respect. Humans also 
appear to be a cooperatively breeding species (Hrdy, 2009), yet we 
respond to distributional inequity. However, unlike Callitrichids, 
humans routinely form cooperative relationships with individu-
als outside of the pair bond, and virtually all experimental tests 
of inequity involve strangers, and often occur in anonymous set-
tings. Thus, humans may be subject to two selective forces. First, 
we are likely selected to be sensitive to inequity in interactions with 
methodology which found a response in chimpanzees (Brosnan 
et al., in review). These results seem to rule out the possibility 
that cognitive differences are related to inequity, as orangutans are 
equally skilful in cognitive (Russon, 1998; Shumaker et al., 2001) 
and exchange (Flemming et al., in revision) tasks as other apes. 
Moreover, they support the cooperation hypothesis, as orangutans, 
while cooperative in experimental studies (Chalmeau et al., 1997; 
Dufour et al., 2008), are not known to cooperate in the wild to a 
great degree, possibly due to their more solitary social organization 
(van Schaik and van Hooff, 1996). These results also support the 
hypothesis that inequity is a by-product of sociality, as orangutans 
are less gregarious than other great apes, although they do form 
relationships and interact much more frequently in some contexts 
than initially recognized (Edwards and Snowdon, 1980; Singleton 
and van Schaik, 2002; van Schaik et al., 2009). The orangutan results 
also indicate that any homology among the apes must be more 
recent than the orangutan split from the African apes.
Amongst the new world monkeys, brown capuchins (Cebus 
apella) have been documented to respond negatively to inequity 
in all but one of four studies which employed a task (Brosnan and 
de Waal, 2003; van Wolkenten et al., 2007; Fletcher, 2008; Silberberg 
et al., 2009). Taken with the data on their responses to inequity in 
the context of cooperation (see The Interplay of Cooperation and 
Inequity above), it is clear that in many contexts, these monkeys are 
sensitive to receiving less than their partner. To explicitly address 
the homology hypothesis, we replicated the test on squirrel mon-
keys (Saimiri spp.), a species which shares a phylogenetic family, 
Cebidae, with capuchins. Squirrel monkeys have a smaller brain 
and neocortex volume per body size than do capuchins (Rilling 
and Insel, 1999) and cooperate in only limited situations (Boinski, 
1987). They are also a highly gregarious, group-living species, and 
are even sympatric with capuchins in some areas. However, in our 
study, squirrel monkeys did not respond negatively to inequity, 
completing the interaction whether or not their partner received 
a greater reward (Talbot et al., in press). They were sensitive to the 
experimental paradigm; subjects were more likely to refuse to par-
ticipate if the rewards violated their expectations than in the control 
condition. These results indicate that the inequity response is not 
homologous within the Family Cebidae, and the distribution across 
new world monkeys and great apes suggests that neither sociality 
nor cognition are sufficient feature to explain it. Given these data, 
the one feature in common to all is frequent cooperation among 
non-kin, indicating the possibility of either a convergence or the 
secondary loss of the trait in non-cooperative species.
The new world monkeys also introduce an interesting caveat in 
the form of the Callitrichids. Callitrichids are cooperative breeders, 
meaning that the parents and, sometimes, adult offspring, work 
together to rear young. Given this intensive level of cooperation 
(Cronin et al., 2005), even when confronted with unequal outcomes 
(Cronin and Snowdon, 2008), one might expect them to be particu-
larly sensitive to inequity. However, among tamarins, there is little, 
if any, evidence that they refuse to participate when outcomes are 
unequal (Neiworth et al., 2009). Given the variation seen among 
species, this result needs to be validated with additional studies of 
cooperative breeders. Nonetheless, this finding may serve to vali-
date the main tenet of the cooperation hypothesis, which is that 
responding to inequity serves to increase the long-term gains from 
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InequIty and punIshment
While the main purpose of the response to inequity seems to be 
recognizing when it is time to find a new partner with whom to 
cooperate, in some situations switching to a new partner may 
not be an option (e.g., due to low availability of other partners, a 
high cost to switching, or the difficulty in establishing sufficient 
trust for cooperation to emerge at the same level). In these cases, 
the recognition of a partner’s low quality that derives from the 
inequity response may secondarily be used to identify situations in 
which it is worth an attempt to alter the current partner’s behavior, 
including punishment (Jensen, 2010; Raihani et al., 2010). This 
provides an alternate option through which individuals can try 
to increase their benefits for cooperating; if they cannot leave and 
find a new partner, they may be able to try changing the behav-
ior of the current one. Even the occasional act of punishment 
may be sufficient to alter the partner’s behavior for the better 
(Bergmüller and Taborsky, 2005).Thus punishment may be more 
likely in those species which have limited options for finding a 
new partner or for which such an action is extremely costly, one 
practical implication of which is that it may be easier to identify 
punishment in species which are known to react behaviorally 
to inequity, but in situations in which individuals have limited 
options for finding new partners.
InequIty and related behavIors
Inequity is related to several behaviors, either because these behav-
iors may contribute to the mechanisms which allow individuals to 
refuse inequitable outcomes, or because the ability has implications 
for the behavior. Below I consider two of these.
InequIty and self-control
Refusing a present and available reward seems to require quite a lot 
of self-control. Primates are known to be good at this (Beran, 2002; 
Evans and Westergaard, 2006; Dufour et al., 2007), and even use 
behavioral distraction strategies to assist in refraining from reach-
ing for foods (Evans and Beran, 2007a), both of which indicate that 
primates have the requisite abilities for the refusals seen in inequity 
responses. One intriguing possibility is that differences in species’ 
ability to delay gratification may be related to their tendency to 
refuse rewards in the context of inequity. Given than there is species 
variation in the ability to delay gratification, for instance with apes 
outperforming monkeys (Evans and Beran, 2007b), it will be interest-
ing to see whether this prediction is supported. It may also be that 
increasing selection for negative reactions to inequity simultaneously 
selected for increased self-control ability. Ecological forces are known 
to shape self-control ability in other contexts (Stevens et al., 2005). On 
the flip side, the cognitive challenge of self-control may serve to limit 
which species are able to respond to inequity by refusing rewards.
InequIty and prosocIal behavIor
All of the studies discussed above focus on how individuals respond 
when they receive less than a partner. However, it is equally interest-
ing to investigate responses when they receive more than a partner. 
In particular, whether species will bring rewards to their partners 
has been of interest to investigate the evolution of human social 
behavior. Presumably the mechanisms which allow individuals to 
compare their outcomes to those of others and recognize when 
individuals other than our partner, as is likely captured in studies 
of inequity and cooperation in the laboratory (e.g., with non-pair 
bonded individuals, who are often both strangers and anonymous). 
On the other hand, we may be selected to ignore inequity within 
close relationships, such as the pair bond (Clark and Grote, 2003), 
as do other cooperatively breeding species. In fact, it is likely that 
humans are not the only species which will show different behavior 
depending upon the relationship involved, an area which needs 
further investigation.
InequIty and relatIonshIps
Related to this, it is possible that interactions may differ within the 
same species depending upon the relationships among the indi-
viduals in question. For instance, in species which form mated 
pairs but nonetheless regularly interact and cooperate with other 
individuals, one might expect no response to inequity among mated 
pairs (due to interdependence), but a present response to inequity 
among non-mated pair adults. For instance, this might describe 
the interactions we would expect in humans, as discussed above. 
Humans show reduced sensitivity to inequity in close relationships 
as compared to more distant ones, which are typically more con-
tingent (Clark and Grote, 2003). As another example, individuals 
within a cooperative breeding group may have differential invest-
ment in the group, or differential cost to finding a new partner. 
Less invested individuals, or those who can more easily find new 
partners, should be less tolerant of inequity. Similar patterns may 
apply in other species which cooperate across many different types 
of relationships.
InequIty and lIfe hIstory
Another prediction which emerges is that responses to inequity 
may differ across life history stages. Some species have different 
relationships with others of their age class depending upon where 
they are in development. For instance, polygynous species may 
go through a stage in an adult single-sex group (e.g., a “bachelor 
group”) prior to becoming the alpha male of a mixed-sex group. 
In some cases, individuals may even have different relationships 
with different individuals during the same life history stage, and so 
show several different behaviors at any given time (but with differ-
ent partners, e.g., humans; see above sections). Since relationships 
and the frequency of cooperation differ in these different stages of 
development, reactions to inequity may vary as well.
An intriguing corollary of this prediction is the possibility of 
particularly enhanced responses to inequity among individuals who 
are in the process of forming pair bonds. Given that individuals are 
in the process of forming a bond which is both critical to repro-
ductive fitness and costly to break, individuals may be best served 
to be hyper vigilant for signs of inequity. In this way they may be 
able to predict future behavior from current actions and limit the 
subsequent costs of either inequity or the requirement to find a 
new mate. This may also provide a likely opportunity to investigate 
deception, as there would be strong selection in favor of behaving 
more equitably in the mating market than once the pair bond was 
formed. Finally, individuals may be particularly likely to tolerate 
inequity once there is a reproductive investment in the relationship. 
Thus inequity may be a mechanism individuals can use to assess 
partner potential early in a relationship.
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that many species pay close attention to their  partners’ behavioral 
outcomes. Any species that socially learns receives information from 
a conspecific which changes their behavior, even if they are not 
consciously aware of it (as they do not need to be consciously aware 
of inequity for it to provide a benefit). Social learning is widespread 
among animals (Zentall et al., 1988; Heyes et al., 1996), and some 
species are quite nuanced, with individuals paying attention to 
relevant features of the social partner when determining whether 
to copy their actions (Swaney et al., 2001; Biro et al., 2003; Perry, 
2009; Hopper, 2010; Horner et al., 2010).
a potentIal evolutIonary pathway
Of course, this is a correlative relationship; we do not know which 
came first, the response to inequity or the tendency to cooperate. 
Although it is challenging to test experimentally, some evidence 
provides at least a hint of which direction evolution may have 
taken. It seems, at this stage, more likely that cooperative behav-
ior evolved first, followed by selection for inequity. Many species 
cooperate occasionally, and such interactions may lead to small 
rewards (or small losses) without the risk of a major cost. It is 
only when cooperation becomes common that some mechanism 
for avoiding excessive losses becomes essential. Thus, individu-
als who came under selection for more extensive cooperation 
because of the benefits such behavior accrued would similarly 
come under strong selection to limit their cooperative interac-
tions to partners who shared the resulting rewards. Those who 
managed to do so, by changing partners when outcomes devi-
ated substantially, would have gained far more than those who 
indiscriminately cooperated with all potential social partners with 
whom there was a net benefit.
It is worth considering a pathway through which the response to 
inequity might have evolved. Cooperation occurs when the benefits 
to both individuals exceed their costs (Bshary and Bergmuller, 
2008; Brosnan et al., 2010c). From a purely cost–benefit perspec-
tive, it should not matter if A’s benefit exceeds B’s; it should still 
be to B’s benefit to participate in the interaction. But what if B 
could reap a far greater benefit by cooperating with C? By recog-
nizing (note, again, that this need not imply cognitive calcula-
tion or understanding) only whether the cost exceeds the benefit, 
B may miss this opportunity. Thus in cooperative interactions 
there should be pressure to maximize outcomes by evaluating 
whether there are other, more lucrative options in the environ-
ment. Responding to inequity would be a mechanism to do this; 
situations in which one’s payoffs deviate substantially from one’s 
social partners could be a reliable signal to evaluate other options. 
In this scenario inequity aversion would serve as the mechanism 
to evaluate when there is the possibility to increase one’s benefit 
from cooperative interactions, and as such function to maximize 
the outcomes from cooperation.
Note that this will be selected only if the additional gains 
from a new partner exceed the cost of switching partners (e.g., 
search costs) and the risk of a worse outcome. The latter occurs 
either if outcomes with C – the new partner – are worse than 
those with B or if the initial difference in outcomes between A 
and B was minimal. Moreover, if the individual accrues indirect 
benefits from staying (i.e., the partner is related, or is assisting 
with offspring care), responses to inequity may not be selected. 
they receive less would work equally well to identify situations in 
which they receive more. However, the selective pressures are quite 
different, thus the behaviors may not manifest equally.
Nonetheless, recent studies indicate that they co-occur and may 
even interact. Although studies show that chimpanzees are unlikely 
to bring food rewards to conspecifics (Silk et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 
2006; Vonk et al., 2008), they do help other individuals (Warneken 
and Tomasello, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007). Moreover, in food 
situations they also notice when they receive more than a partner, 
refusing preferred rewards more often when their partners receive 
less preferred ones than when they also receive the preferred fruit 
(Brosnan et al., 2010a). This indicates that while individuals may 
not work to improve their partners’ wellbeing, they do notice the 
disparity.
Capuchins are quite prosocial, possibly moreso than chimpan-
zees, and bring rewards to conspecific partners in several situa-
tions (de Waal et al., 2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008). A 
recent study specifically investigated how prosocial behavior inter-
acted with inequity, and found that capuchins were prosocial (e.g., 
brought food rewards to partners) even in situations in which their 
partners received more, or even when the puller received nothing. 
However, when inequity became greater, prosocial behavior ceased 
(Brosnan et al., 2010b). Thus, emerging evidence indicates that 
these two preferences interact to shape behavior. Further research 
is needed that investigates these two behaviors in additional species, 
including those which do not respond to inequity, to determine the 
degree of overlap, and the limits of prosociality.
thoughts on the evolutIon of InequIty
why the response makes sense In lIght of natural selectIon
Why should we care if another individual gets more than we 
do? This is particularly true if our outcome is a net gain, or 
if the response actually increases inequity, a common result in 
these experiments (see above and Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; 
Brosnan et al., 2005; Yamagishi et al., 2009). In these cases, it 
seems particularly surprising that any rational individual would 
choose an outcome which makes them less well off in the short 
term. On the other hand, a negative reaction to inequity is not 
particularly surprising. First of all, despite a focus on cost–ben-
efit analysis in behavioral studies, the entire concept of natural 
selection is based on relative gains, not absolute ones. Thus, there 
is every reason to expect natural selection to favor behaviors 
which increase relative gains, even at the expense of absolute 
outcomes, or which favor long-term benefits over short-term 
costs (e.g. Frank, 1988). Note, of course, that this does not mean 
that the individual must understand this comparison; the beauty 
of natural selection is that any behavior which increases relative 
fitness, however inadvertently, will be selected, regardless of the 
animals’ comprehension of either their behavior, their relative 
outcomes, or their benefits (see Hypotheses for the Function of 
the Response to Inequity).
Second, many of the mechanisms for the behavior seem to be in 
place. As discussed above (see Inequity Paradigms in Other Species), 
contrast effects occur in a variety of species, and it does not seem to 
be a great cognitive leap from comparing one’s current outcomes to 
one’s own previous outcomes, to comparing one’s current outcomes 
to one’s partners’ previous outcomes. Moreover, we already know 
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point to a promising new avenue for investigating sensitivity to 
inequity, particularly in species which do not respond to distribu-
tional inequity. Such results may also help to distinguish between 
sensitivity to inequity and reactivity to inequity, the latter being the 
important criteria for the current hypothesis. These situations may 
also clarify the range of situations in which responses to inequity 
may be relevant.
the dIfference between notIcIng InequIty and respondIng to 
InequIty
One critical area of study is whether or not individuals notice ineq-
uity. Current studies measure whether individuals react to ineq-
uity, however it is possible to recognize it in situations in which 
individuals do not respond. For instance, do cooperative breeders 
fail to notice that their partner receives more, or have they been 
selected to not respond because of the high costs of finding a new 
partner? Are the individual differences in responses due to some 
individuals failing to notice inequity, or conditions in some situ-
ations (e.g., some relationships) not favoring the response? This 
has important implications for whether behavior will change as the 
degree of inequity increases. In fact we do know that despite little 
evidence of prosocial behavior in the form of active giving (Silk 
et al., 2005; Jensen et al., 2006; Vonk et al., 2008), chimpanzees do 
alter their behavior when they receive more than a partner (Brosnan 
et al., 2010a), indicating that they notice, despite not changing their 
behavior in any way that alters the outcomes. Future studies which 
can continue to tease apart this difference will be critical for fully 
understanding the evolution of the response.
understandIng the varIatIon
Another pressing line of research is to better understand the 
variations in the response among individuals of the same species. 
Although a variety of factors are known to cause variation in the 
response (see Inequity Paradigms in Other Species), no factor has 
yet emerged which explains the variation consistently. Thus, addi-
tional research to clarify the role of individual factors, such as sex, 
age, reproductive status, and personality, as well as social factors, 
such as the relationships between individuals and group behavior, 
are required. This is a logistical challenge, as such comparisons 
require a large sample sizes of individuals who are tested in multiple 
combinations, which can be difficult to obtain, particularly among 
larger species such as primates. Nonetheless, research in this area 
is ongoing and the extra level of control possible in non-human 
research may yield additional insights to and predictions about 
human behavior (Brosnan et al., 2009).
testIng the evolutIonary model
Finally, it is important to test the proposed evolutionary model 
of inequity responses. Of course, testing possible evolutionary 
pathways is by necessity a roundabout approach, but there are 
some interesting possibilities. First, the experimental economics 
approach is ideal for designing games which allow for direct com-
parisons across multiple species or multiple conditions. Among 
non-humans in particular, it is possible to test the same individu-
als repeatedly, engaging them in multiple different types of games 
(with different parameters and payoffs) and with multiple partners 
over extended periods of time. This has been done successfully 
Thus, the theory predicts that responding to inequity may be 
more beneficial for some types of cooperation than others. For 
instance, this response may be more likely to be selected in situ-
ations with potentially high costs to doing relatively less well 
than one’s partners, for instance in winner-take-all situations 
such as mating coalitions.
what Is needed next?
data from other specIes and relatIonshIps
While this paper is almost exclusively about non-human primates, 
it will be important to test this theory in other taxa (Drea and 
Frank, 2003; Bekoff and Pierce, 2010). There are several taxa, for 
instance canids, cetaceans, and birds, in which some species show 
a greater tendency to cooperate than others. There are also non-
primate cooperative breeders, allowing all three aspects of this 
hypothesis to be tested more broadly. In particular we need data 
on not just species which routinely cooperate, but also on closely 
related species which do not do so in order to further evaluate the 
link between inequity and cooperation. Finally, it would be useful 
to test combinations of individuals which are not often addressed 
(e.g., cooperative breeders which are not part of the same mated 
pair) in order to address some of the additional implications of the 
theory, as outlined above.
data from other contexts
We also need data from a broader variety of situations. For 
instance, primates respond to differences in outcomes, but do not 
seem to respond to differences in the effort required to achieve 
those outcomes (Fontenot et al., 2007; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). 
However, responses to inequity may occur in situations other than 
differential food distributions; for instance, several studies have 
found links between equity and play behavior in non-human spe-
cies (Bekoff, 2001, 2004; Dugatkin and Bekoff, 2003; van Leeuwen 
et al., 2010). Despite the fact that food rewards are particularly 
relevant, making them an easy way to study behavior in experimen-
tal situations, some species may respond differently to food than 
non-food situations (Warneken et al., 2007). Thus it is important 
to collect data from a broader, and more species-representative, 
array of situations.
Related to this, measures of inequity other than the rate of 
reward refusal or the rate of refusal to participate in the task will 
help clarify the range of situations in which responses to inequity 
occur. These measures are useful, as they are easy to quantify and the 
methodology can be used across a wide variety of species. However, 
giving up a desirably food reward requires quite a cost on the part 
of the individual, potentially making this less likely to occur than 
other behaviors. Thus more nuanced behavioral (such as changes 
in affect) and physiological (such as skin conductance or heart 
rate) measures may help to uncover situations in which individu-
als, responses to inequity are not so explicit. This is particularly 
important in species for which there is no evidence of such explicit 
responses to inequity.
Finally, there are other situations in which inequity may occur. 
A recent study finds evidence that in their play behavior, goril-
las are sensitive to their immediate social status, and work to 
maintain social inequities that increase their status with respect 
to another individual (van Leeuwen et al., 2010). These results 
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